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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
lations Board enables it to maintain a close supervision of labor activity.
The power of subpoena allows the board to look at the market place and
its demands in light of the underlying policy favoring a free flow of
commerce.3 5 Specific abuses are and can be outlined by Congress in order
to prevent general interference with the institution of collective bar-
gaining. The Board has the quasi-judicial power to interpret and apply
legislative provisions. However, in the area of collective bargaining the
union power may be combined with that of management. This necessi-
tates greater supervision than provided for by the labor statutes. As in-
dicated by the decisions in the principal cases, the Supreme Court will
recognize the power of the National Labor Relations Board, but will take
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws in certain cases.
It is submitted that adherence to the tests announced in the Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea cases sufficiently limits the Allen Bradley doc-
trine.3 6 The limitation brings within the Court's jurisdiction only those
cases in which agreements imposing restraints extend beyond the bar-
gaining unit. However, the collective bargaining agreements falling
within a bargaining unit are to be controlled by the administrative
method set up by the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments.
This approach will best promote the policies of the Sherman Act and of
the labor statutes. A joint judicial and administrative approach to union
antitrust activity would allow flexibility in reflecting the demands of
the market place. Such joint effort is at the heart of our constitutional
system and would promote effective government and a sound economy.
J. DWAINE ROYBAL
WATER RIGHTS: UTAH ADJUDICATION EMPHASIZES FEDERAL-STATE CON-
FLICT.-The Utah state engineer joined the United States as a necessary
party defendant in a water adjudication of the Green River. Although
the lower court recognized the claim of the UnitedStates to water rights
purchased from private individuals, it refused to'recognize claims to
additional unspecified water rights. The United States appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court contending that the adjudicated water rights of
individuals should be subject to the right of the United States to use all
the water necessary for national forest reservations. Held, affirmed. The
United States is bound by the decree to the same extent as any other
party. "Therefore, any water rights which have been or could have
been claimed within this adjudication are now concluded by it." Green
River Adjudication v. United States, 404 P.2d 251 (Utah 1965).
The states claim control of all water rights within their boundaries.'
"Id. at 305, 394.
uFor a discussion of the lengths to which the Court might have gone with the Allen
Bradley decision see Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and
Allen Bradley, 13 LAD. L. J. 957 (1962).
'Fed. Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
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The United States claims control of all water rights within federal
reservations. 2 This conflict is the source of the federal-state water rights
controversy.3
The history of this controversy began with the treaties that ceded
the land which is now the western states to the United States. 4 Because
of the cession, the United States has a common law riparian landowner's
right to use water flowing through its land. This includes a right to use
a reasonable quantity of water for domestic, agricultural, and other
purposes incidental to use of the land and a correlative duty to return
the surplus to the stream to maintain the natural flow to lands down-
stream.5
If a sole owner of all the land along a water course grants a non-
riparian water use, it is enforceable as a property right against any
adverse claimant. 6 However, if a riparian owner of less than all the
land along a water course grants a nonriparian water use, such grant
is enforceable only against the grantor and his successors in interest.7
Downstream riparian landowners are not affected by the grant, since
the riparian rights they hold are incidental to their land ownership. s
Since the United States was the sole owner of Western America by treaty,
it owned all the land along its water courses and had riparian rights
to all running water. These rights necessarily included the right of a
sole riparian owner to grant proprietary water rights to nonriparian uses.
During the California Gold Rush of 1849, however, a rule evolved
conflicting with this common law riparian doctrine. The miners de-
veloped a custom that the first user of a quantity of water had a right
superior to that of any subsequent user. This rule was recognized by
the state courts and the water right so created became known as an
"apropriation." 9 Since the United States, except in a few early cases, 10
failed to assert its rights as sole riparian owner, the California courts
held that this appropriative right was as perfect "as if held under an
express grant from the owner of the lands adjacent."" The California
'Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
sHearings on S. 1275 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Hereinafter referred to as
'' Hearings. I I
'Note, 26 MONT. L. REv. 199, 200 n.5.
'Hargrave v. Cook, 108 Cal. 72, 41 Pac. 18 (1895); Nuttall v. Bracewell, L.R. 2 Ex. 1
(1866).
6Ferguson v. Sherreff, 6 Dunlop, Bell & Murray's Report, Scotch Session Cases
(Second Series) 1363, 1374 (1844); the court said:
I know nothing more rudimental in our law, than that private rivers are the property
of those through whose lands they flow. . . .It is a right of property in the stream
itself. Accordingly, where a river runs its entire course through the land of a single
person, he. as sole proprietor, may do with it as he pleases. . . .A river is. in this
respect, exactly like a private lake surrounded by one estate ....
7Gould v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 6 N.Y. 542 (1852).
"Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 352, 20 L.J. Ex. 212 (1851).
'In Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 339, 10 Pac. 674, 719 (1886), the court said: "The
Courts have treated prior appropriators of water on public lands of the United States
as having a better right than a subsequent appropriator. .... "
"For example, United States v. Parrott, Fed. Cas. No. 15,998 (1858).
"Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 181, 76 Am. Dec. 472 (1860).
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rule thus vested title in the first appropriator which was good against
all other persons. Congress adopted the California water rights rule
by passing the Act of 1866.12 Since this Act vested the miners with
complete ownership of their appropriative water rights, it granted ap-
propriations in fee simple.13
Both the California rule and the express terms of the Act required
compliance with local law before a person could acquire appropriative
water rights.14  Because compliance with state law was a condition
precedent to the federal grant,'5 the administrative control of the state
over water users was regarded by the public as indicating state owner-
ship of water. This apparent state ownership blurred the distinction
between federal property rights and state regulatory rights.'" This
distinction was largely immaterial for thirty years, but then it became
the fundament of the federal-state water rights controversy.
The controversy began with the passage of the Forest Service Ad-
ministration Act of 1897.17 This act authorized the reservation of public
lands for national forest purposes and the promulgation of rules for use
of water on forest reservations.'" This Act imposed a limitation upon
all subsequent sales of reserved lands, and caused the cessation of the
automatic grant of "fee simple" appropriative rights on the affected
watersheds. 19 The automatic grant ceased because, under the Act of
1866, only unreserved public domain is "public land" which is unquali-
fiedly subject to sale and disposition. Thus the only appropriators to
12"Act of 1866'' will be used to refer to the Act itself, its amendments, and successors
including the Desert Land Act of 1877. Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 253, 43 U.S.C. 661(1964); Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. 321 (1964).
'Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 275(1879). "Feel' is used here to mean that Congress granted all possible ownership;
it does not mean ownership of the corpus of the water.
14Act of 1866, §§ 1, 9, supra note 12.
ET]he mineral lands of the public domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are
hereby declared to be free and open to exploration and occupation by all citizens of
the United States. . . .subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and
subject also to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, sofar as the same may not conflict with the laws of the United States.[Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining. . .or
other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledgedby local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such
vested rights shall be. . .protected in the same ...
'Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 14, 21 (1905). The court held that the rights of an
appropriator rest upon the laws of Congress, and the legislative enactment of a State
is only a condition which brings the law of Congress into force.
'61 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 171 (3d ed. 1911).
130 Stat. 34 (1897). This act referred to the Act of March 3, 1891 26 Stat. 1095,
1103 (1891) which provided at § 24:
That the President of the United States may, from time to time set apart and reserve,in any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in any part of thepublic lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of com-
mercial value or not, as public reservations, and the President shall, by public proclama-
tion, declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
'"All waters on such reservations may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or
irrigation purposes, under the laws of the State wherein such forest reservations
are situated, or under the laws of the United States and the rules and regulations
established thereunder." 30 Stat. 36 (1897).
"Because the statutes set out here apply to all public land included in the Withdrawal
of Public Lands Act, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964), what is said
he,'e applies to reservations generally.
[Vol. 27,
3
Wilburn: Green River Adjudication v. United States
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1965
RECENT DECISIONS
receive property rights were those acquiring water rights before the
reservation of the land through which the water flowed. 20  Subsequent
appropriators received only a revocable license from the United States.
The water rights appropriated subsequent to reservation will be re-
ferred to as "reservation apropriations." The water rights appropriated
before reservation will be referred to as "Act appropriations." Reserva-
tion appropriations, unlike Act appropriations, are not "fee simple"
rights. Reservation appropriations are defeasable by partial or total
revocation of the federal license. The United States may revoke the
license in whole or in part by using the water for reservation purposes, 21
or by promulgating federal administrative rules to replace inconsistent
state regulations. 22 However, unless revoked, the federal license permits
state control of all water users within the state.2 This license is the sole
basis of the reservation appropriator's property right.24
The power of the federal government in this area is increased by its
relative immunity from state action. Thus, the court's decree in the
instant case is probably unenforceable. Because the United States has
the power to reserve water rights for use on its property,25 its assertion
of those water rights as against the state would not be a taking of prop-
erty. Therefore, inverse condemnation under the Tucker Act would
be unavailing. 26 Because all water rights not granted away are federal
property,27 an injunction against the United States would be ineffective
for a "State cannot compel use of federal property on terms other than
those prescribed or authorized by Congress. '28
'DFPC v. Oregon, supra note 1.
'Arizona v. California, aupra note 2, at 587.
n State of California is admitted into the Union upon the express condition that the
people of said State, through their legislature or otherwise, shall never interfere with
the primary disposal of the public lands within its limits, and shall pass no law and
do no act whereby the title of the United States to, and right to dispose of, the same
shall be impaired or questioned ...
Act of Admission of the State of California into the Union § 3, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
All other western states have similar clauses in their Acts of Admission.
'California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64
(1935). The Court, construing the Act of 1866 and the Desert Land Act of 1877,
said, "all non-navigable waters. . .of the public domain became. . .subject to the
plenary control of the designated states .... " See also Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter,
9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 265 (1900).
"Nonetheless, a reservation appropriator has important statutory rights, such as a
right to compensation, under Acts of Congress. See infra note 31. Also, a reservation
appropriator's power to sue for an injunction will test whether the Federal official,
who has interferred with the Appropriator's water rights, was acting pursuant to
statutory authority. Whether sovereign immunity protects the official from suit
depends on whether the official's act is authorized. The terms of the statute
creating the reservation determine the scope of the official's authority. If the
official's act of taking the reservation appropriator's water right is unauthorized, the
official is enjoinable because he acted in his individual capacity. Malone v. Bow-
doin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963).
'Arizona v. California, upra note 2.
128 U.S.C. 1346(c), 1491 (1964).
"In Howell v. Johnson, 89 Fed. 556, 558 (D. Mont. 1898), the court held: "The
national government is the proprietor and owner of all the land. ., .which it has
not sold or granted to someone competent to take and hold the same. . . .The
national government can sell or grant the same or the use thereof. . .under such
conditions as many seem to it proper."
'Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958).
1965]
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The great extent of federal power in this area of water rights law
gives rise to an apparent danger of federal confiscation of appropriative
water rights without compensation. Even if federal ownership of reser-
vation appropriations were denied, the possibility of uncompensated
federal confiscation remains. Those who deny federal ownership advance
the following argument. 29
Appropriative water rights are the creature of state law.
Federal courts refuse to recognize state law on federal reservations.
Because of this, federal courts refuse to recognize appropriative rights
on federal reservations.
Therefore, appropriative water rights in streams that flow over reserva-
tions can be confiscated for use on federal reservations without com-
pensation.
But whether states rights or federal ownership is emphasized, little actual
danger of uncompensated taking of water rights exists. Act appropria-
tions are compensable property under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 0 Reservation appropriations are compensable "prop-
erty" by Act of Congress.3 '
Although there is a possibility of uncompensated taking of reserva-
tion appropriations under Article IV of the United States Constitution "3 2
it is remote. Congress has consistently elected to compensate for all
appropriations taken for federal projects ;33 and the Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted Acts of Congress authorizing federal projects
as requiring compensation for both Act and reservation appropriations. 34
The Federal Reclamation Act, the Federal Power Act, and the Federal
Flood Control Act have all been drafted and interpreted in this manner.3 5
The principal significance of this instant case is that is illustrates
the viewpoint of those who fear federal taking of water rights without
compensation, even though such taking would be contrary to well estab-
lished in government policy. In the instant case, the court said: "If...
'Senator Kuchel, Hearings, supra note 3, at 22; FPC v. Oregon, supra note 1 at
452-53, 456-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting.)
80Department of Justice Memorandum, Hearings, supra note 3, at 12, and cases
therein.
"The Federal Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964),
provides that water rights within the meaning of the Act will include both reserva-
tion and Act appropriative water rights. Section 8 of the above act provides that,
"beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."
Vested rights and state laws defining reservation appropriations are unaffected by
the Act. 43 U.S.C. § 383.
The United States Supreme Court construed the above statutes to mean that "the
federal law adopts that of the State as the test of federal liability. . . ." United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739, 743 (1950).
Section 821 of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 791
(1964), is substantially identical. The Court construed § 821 to require compensation
for state defined appropriative water rights. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
347 U.S. 239, 251 (1954).
The Federal Flood Control Act 58 Stat. 887 (1944), 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b) (1964)
has a like provision. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463 (1931), held that
appropriators must be compensated whenever appropriative rights are taken.
"Arizona v. California, supra note 2, at 598.
"United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra note 31, at 740 n. 14-15.
"Ibid. at 742.
wSee supra note 31.
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the government... could be wholly arbitrary about asserting water rights
if and when it pleased .... [I]n the future... the private water rights ad-
judicated could be made a shambles of; and the principle of res adjudi-
cata defeated." This attitude is demonstrated by the introduction of
Senate bill 1275.36 The purpose of the bill was stated to be the pro-
tection of all state and private water rights from uncompensated taking.
37
As shown earlier,38 the states have no water rights in their sovereign
capacity because appropriative rights are dependent upon federal grant
or federal license. Since the federal grants are made only to citizens,
any water rights a state may have are equivalent to water rights held
by a private citizen. Therefore, although the bill purported to protect
state water rights, it actually would protect only private rights from
federal taking without compensation. 39
Senate bill 1275 sought to achieve its goal by extending the require-
ment of use, a necessary element of all appropriative water rights, to
the proprietary water rights of the United States.40 Since the states reg-
ulate the use of all appropriative water rights, 41 and the United States
uses very little of its water,42 the effect of this proposal would be an
uncompensated conveyance from the United States to the several western
states of the bulk of federal proprietary water rights. 43 Senate bill 1275
failed to pass.
Any such bill that would restrict federal water rights to water ac-
tually used by the government would be contrary to the public interest.
The value of recreation and watershed areas now protected within fed-
eral reservations is not measurable monetarily. Such areas are valuable
in their natural state because they are rapidly becoming the nation's
only source of clean water. Whether water from these areas should be
used should depend, as it does now, on the particular circumstances of
each case. Only on this basis can a balance be achieved between the
value of recreation and watershed areas and the value of a proposed use.
Assumption of the risk that Congress might authorize confiscation of
reservation appropriations is on balance preferable to absolute protecting
reservation appropriations by a conveyance to the several western states.
WILLIAM K. WILBURN
'Senator Kuchel, Hearings, supra note 3, at 22, 132. Senator Allott, id. at 135.
78Senator Kuchel, ibid.
'Supra notes 14, 23 and 27.
'Senator Church, Hearings, supra note 3, at 134.
'Senator Kuchel, supra note 36.
'California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 23.
"Mr. Clark, Assistant Attorney General of the United States for Public Lands,
Hearings, supra note 3, 'at 55.
"Department of Justice Memorandum, supra note 30; Mr. Goldberg, id. at 133.
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